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New Directions in United States Food Aid:
Human Rights and Economic Development*
JAMES

R.

WALCZAK**

I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of human rights encompasses not only political rights, but also economic and social rights.' Certainly the
most basic among these rights is the freedom from hunger and
malnutrition. 2 The United States, as the world's largest produ* Adapted from a presentation made at a conference on human rights, hosted by
the International Legal Studies Program, College of Law and the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado (Boulder), and held at Denver-Boulder in spring 1978.
** B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; M.A., J.D., University of Denver; M.L.T.
candidate, Georgetown University. Staff Attorney, Foreign Agriculture and Commodity Stabilization Division, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The opinions and views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do
not represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
1. See generally the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, Annex, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 49-52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
For the most recent statement of the United States policy advocating this concept

of human rights, see

SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC LTURE, NUTRITION, & FORESTRY, 95T

A REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
480 42-45 (Comm. Print 1978)
[hereinafter cited as SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT]. See also Foreign Food Assistance
of the United States, Report of Secretary of Agriculture Bergland to John J. Gilligan,
Chairman, Development Coordination Comm. (Sept. 29, 1977).
2. Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 1, at 50-51, states:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family,
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually
and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific
programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and
by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to
achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural
resources;
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cer and exporter of agricultural commodities, bears an especially important responsibility in meeting these needs. 3 In this
respect, this nation's commitment to the conquest of hunger
and malnutrition is a critical indicator of our overall sincerity
towards human rights.
Food aid, as well as all other forms of assistance, however,
does not exist in a vacuum. It is affected by a great variety of
domestic and international pressures which are both political
and economic in nature. This situation is unavoidable in a
world marked by fierce ideological differences and increasingly
scarce natural resources. Nevertheless, it is the moral obligation of the United States to anticipate these factors as best we
can, rather than haphazardly to react to every political and
economic pressure, and to do our utmost for the cause of
human rights within these constraints.
Another aspect of the general problem, often overlooked,
is the complex task of administering food aid programs. In both
donor and recipient countries, disputes over food aid development strategies and approaches, resource allocations, and
"bureaucratic turf," sometimes renders the "war on hunger" a
painstakingly slow process which often appears self-defeating. 4
This paper will discuss, in the political, economic, and
bureaucratic context, recent and proposed legislative changes
in the U.S. food aid program. These changes embrace food aid
as a development mechanism, food security, and human rights.
Before discussing these points in detail, however, it will be use(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and
food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of
world food supplies in relation to need.
3. Sol M. Linowitz, Chairman, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, recently stated:
The war against hunger must be a universal campaign, waged on
many fronts simultaneously by many diverse actors. Americans have a
leading role to play. The U.S.A. is the largest producer of food in the
world today. It has vast scientific, technical and managerial resources to
contribute. In fact, the challenge of eliminating hunger calls upon the
characteristic U.S. traits of ingenuity, optimism and humanitarian concern.

Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1979, at C6, col. 6.
The Presidential Commission on World Hunger was created by Exec. Order No.
12,078, 43 Fed. Reg. 39,741 (1978).
4. Anderson, The Human Right Not To Be Hungry, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1978, at
C7, col. 5.
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ful to outline the historical and legislative background of U.S.
food aid efforts. 5
II. U.S. FOOD AID PROGRAM-A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. History
The U.S. food aid program is structured around the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,1 better known as Public Law 480 or the Food for Peace Program.
P.L. 480 was an outgrowth of: (1) the need to dispose of
huge grain surpluses built up in this country after World War
I; (2) the desire to develop export markets for agricultural
commodities; and (3) the desire to combat communist propaganda and criticism of U.S. wealth in a poor and hungry postwar world.7 Humanitarian motives were also an important factor, but it was these first three elements from which P.L. 480
drew its primary support.
Significant amendments to P.L. 480 were made in 1959
and 1964.' These amendments were primarily concerned with
the administration of P.L. 480. Of greater importance, however, was the Food for Peace Act of 1966.10 This Act was the
turning point in the U.S. food aid program: for the first time,
Congress made it clear that along with encouraging agricultural and economic development, building commercial markets for U.S. exports, and supporting U.S. foreign policies," the
humanitarian purposes of P.L. 480 were to receive primary
consideration. The disposal of surplus agricultural products
was no longer the raison d'Stre of P.L. 480.12
5. For greater detail on this subject see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, P.L. 480
(Foreign Agric. Econ. Rep. No. 142 Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited
as P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES]; SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL Poucv,
FOOD FOR PEACE, 1954-1978-MAJOR CHANGES IN LEGISLATION, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
(Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as FOOD FOR PEACE].
6. Pub. L. No. 480, 68 Stat. 454 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691, 1691a, 1701-36
(1976)).
7. FOOD FOR PEACE, supra note 5, at 1-3; P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note
5, at 1-3.
8. Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-341, 73 Stat. 606.
9. Act of Oct. 8, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-638, 78 Stat. 1035.
10. Pub. L. No. 89-808, 80 Stat. 1526 (1966).
For a general explanation of the major changes made by the Food for Peace Act
of 1966 see FOOD FOR PEACE, supra note 5, at 8-11.
11. P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 4. See SPCIAL TASK FORCE
REPolr, supra note 1, at 6-8.
12. The Food for Peace Act of 1966 also made one other very important mechaniCONCESSIONAL SAT,

546

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL.

8:543

Subsequent amendments to the Act continued to place
increased emphasis on the humanitarian and developmental
aspects of food aid. 3 Reacting to what was perceived as grave
abuses in the program, Congress restricted the amount of food
aid made available to countries not among the poorest of the
poor." Presently, the law requires that seventy-five percent of
the food aid commodities provided each fiscal year under Title
I of P.L. 480 be delivered to countries that: (1) meet the poverty
criterion established for International Development Association financing; and (2) are affected by an inability to secure
sufficient food for their immediate requirements through their
own production or commercial purchases from abroad. 5
In addition to these minimum programming requirements,
Congress has recently focused upon the use of food aid as a
development mechanism. The International Development and
Food Assistance Acts of 1975's and 19771 created new statutory
authority and criteria for the application of food aid to chronic
development problems. The latter act also injected the issue of
cal change in P.L. 480: Under the original legislation, P.L. 480 concessional sales were
made for local, mostly unconvertible, currencies. By 1959, it became clear that the U.S.
was rapidly building up huge reserves of foreign currencies with which very little could
be done. Therefore, the 1959 amendments authorized sales for U.S. dollars and the
1966 Act provided for the total phasing out of local currency sales by 1971. Since 1971,
sales have been made solely for U.S. dollars or convertible foreign currencies. Foot FOR
PEACE, supra note 5, at 5-8; P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 3-4. However, in some countries large amounts of local currencies still remain under U.S.
control. P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 29-31; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, USE OF U.S. FOOD RESOURCES FOR DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES-AN ExAMiNATION OF THE ISSUES, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as
FOOD RESOURCES FOR DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES].

13. See the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795;
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89
Stat. 849; and International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-88, 91 Stat. 533. For a general explanation of the changes made by these and
other amendments see FOOD FOR PEACE, supra note 5, at 12-19.
14. The abuses referred to centered upon the use of food aid for political and
military purposes. In particular, during the early 1970s, large percentages of the P.L.
480 program were being used to support and finance the war in Southeast Asia. FOOD
RESOURCES FOR DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES, supra note 12, at 26-29. The diversion of P.L. 480
commodities to political/military purposes was further aggravated by the 1973-1974
grain shortage that followed the Russian wheat deal of 1972. This shortage of commodities ties drastically reduced the overall level of P.L. 480 programming during this
period. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
15. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1711 (Supp. 1979).
16. Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89 Stat. 849 (1975).
17. Pub. L. No. 95-88, 91 Stat. 533 (1977).
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human rights and food aid into the statute itself. The content
and administration of these amendments is discussed more
fully below.
In summary, the legislative history of P.L. 480 indicates
that Congress intends that U.S. food aid policies be governed
primarily by humanitarian and developmental considerations.
The political and economic factors affecting this program, however, are still important, both in terms of domestic political
support for the P.L. 480 program and its impact upon international affairs. Nevertheless, the legislation rightfully views
these various factors as being mutually compatible. To the
extent that they are not compatible in any given situation, it
is incumbent upon the administrators of the program to exercise prudent judgment in weighing the various factors involved.
B.

s
Mechanics of P.L. 480"

1. Statutory Framework
At the present time, there are three basic programs run
under P.L. 480. First, Title I of the Act provides that sales of
agricultural commodities may be made on a concessional basis
to "friendly" countries for U.S. dollars or convertible foreign
currency." Once a Title I agreement has been approved, the
importing country purchases the commodity in the United
States commercial market on a competitive bid basis. Through
a prearranged system with the Commodity Credit Corporation,20 the commodity supplier receives payment in U.S. dollars. The Corporation then is repaid by the importing country
over a period of twenty to forty years." The grant element in
this type of financing transaction is estimated at sixty percent."
18. For a detailed explanation of mechanics and policy aspects of a P.L. 480
transaction see P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 13-29; and SPECIAL TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 64-94.
19. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1703(b) (Supp. 1979).
20. The Commodity Credit Corporation is a Federally owned corporation operated
under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture. 15 U.S.C. §§ 714-714m (1976).
21. Sales for dollars are made pursuant to a maximum repayment period of 20
years with a two-year grace period on the first principal installment. Credit for repayments to be made in convertible foreign currency may be extended over a maximum
of 40 years with a grace period on principal payments of up to 10 years. P.L. 480
CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 15-18.
22. P.L. 480 CONCESSIONAL SALES, supra note 5, at 12.
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Ideally, this system will acclimate food aid recipients to
United States' trade practices, and as these countries become
more developed, they will gradually become commercial customers of United States commodities. This is one of the stated
objectives of the Act.2
Another important aspect of Title I transactions is that, in
most cases, Title I commodities are sold in the recipient countries, thereby generating local currencies. The Act requires that
the P.L. 480 agreement specify the manner in which such proceeds will be utilized. That is, such uses must be "self-help"
measures designed to enhance agricultural development, rural
2
development, nutrition, or population planning.
Second, Title I permits the donation of food commodities
to needy countries. Commodities generally are donated either
to the poorest of countries or to countries which have suffered
a major disaster. More than three-fourths of the commodities
donated under this program are channeled through the U.N.
World Food Program and nonprofit voluntary agencies such as
CARE and the Catholic Relief Services.2 1 It is felt that these
agencies provide the best means for assuring that the commodities in question will be distributed directly to the poor.
Finally, Title I of the Act, which embodies the food for
development provisions, was added by the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977.26 The concept of food
for development contained in Title III, as well as the policy
issues involved, is discussed in detail below.
2. Administrative Framework
Most of the administrative functions required under the
Act are granted to the President. By Executive Order No.
10,900," dated January 5, 1961, the functions of the President
have been delegated to various cabinet officers, most notably
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and by subdelegation, the Administrator
23. 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
24. 7 U.S.C. § 1709 (1976); 7 U.S.C.A. § 1706(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
25. P.L. 480, § 201(b), sets specific statutory quantities that must be channelled
through these organizations. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1721(b) (Supp. 1979).
26. Pub. L. No. 95-88, 91 Stat. 533 (1977) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1727-1727f
(Supp. 1979)).
27. 3 C.F.R. 429 (1959-1963 Compilation).
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of the Agency for International Development. This Executive
order has never been significantly revised despite the numerous
amendments to P.L. 480 and their decided impact upon the
28
basic legislative intent.
Technically, primary responsibility for the administration
of P.L. 480 rests with the Secretary of Agriculture. However,
most major P.L. 480 policy decisions are made by consensus of
the Food Aid Subcommittee of the Development Coordination
Committee. The primary actors in this process are the Department of Agriculture,. the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, the Office of Management and
Budget, and to a lesser extent, the Department of the Treasury
and the Department of Commerce. On a day-to-day basis, policy and administrative responsibilities are shared by the Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development.
In practice, the decisionmaking process in P.L. 480 is very
complex and time-consuming. This result is only natural considering the number and diversity of interests affected by food
aid programming. Nevertheless, bureaucratic bottlenecks
hindering the ultimate objectives of the P.L. 480 program must
be minimized. To this end, the Special Task Force on the Operation of P.L. 480, established by the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, has recommended a
simplification of the P.L. 480 administrative structure. 2
III. FOOD Am AND HuMAN RIGHTS
President Carter, more than any other American president, has taken up the cause of human rights. Congress also
has responded to the present emphasis on human rights with
enactment of the International Development and Food Assis28. An updated and more streamlined delegation of authority under P.L. 480
would clearly be desirable. As a practical matter, however, it may be impossible to
achieve this goal without first resolving the difficult bureaucratic problem of how U.S.
foreign aid should be administered. Prior to his death, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey
proposed a reorganization for the administration of U.S. foreign assistance. This proposal will be brought again before the Congress during the 96th Congress, 2d Session.
Therefore, it is possible that significant changes will be made in the administration of
food aid assistance in the near future. In reference to possible changes see SPECIAL TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at xii-xvii.
29. SPECLL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 96-115.
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tance Act of 1977. This Act added the following section to P.L.
480:
SEC. 112. (a) No agreement may be entered into under this
title to finance the sale of agricultural commodities to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person,
unless such agreement will directly benefit the needy people in
such country. An agreement will not directly benefit the needy
people in the country for purposes of the preceding sentence unless either the commodities themselves or the proceeds from their
sale will be used for specific projects or programs which the President determines would directly benefit the needy people of that
country. The agreement shall specify how the projects or programs will be used to benefit the needy people and shall require
a report to the President on such use within 6 months after the
commodities are delivered to the recipient country.
(b) To assist in determining whether the requirements of
subsection (a) are being met, the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives may require
the President to submit in writing information demonstrating
that an agreement will directly benefit the needy people in a
country.
(c) In determining whether or not a government falls within the
provisions of subsection (a), consideration shall be given to the
extent of cooperation of such government in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of internationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross,
or groups or persons acting under the authority of the United
Nations or of the Organization of American States.
(d) The President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the President of the Senate, and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate, in the
annual presentation materials on planned programming of assistance under this Act, a full and complete report regarding the
30
steps he has taken to carry out the provisions of this section.

This provision of law raises a number of questions: how
does one determine which countries are gross violators of
human rights? Is this a realistic approach to the human rights
30. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1712 (Supp. 1979).
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problem? Is such an approach compatible with military and
foreign policy needs and objectives?
In practice, no P.L. 480 recipients have been formally labeled as gross violators of human rights. However, if the recipient is considered a "problem" country, then language meeting
the requirements of section 112 is inserted into the P.L. 480
agreement. This determination is made by an interagency
human rights review committee headed by the Deputy Secretary of State, which reviews all proposed P.L. 480 agreements.
Of course, in the words of the Special Task Force Report,
"[tihese provisions in the agreement make no mention of
human rights per se, . . . and a nation in signing such an
agreement is in no way admitting to any wrongdoing in the
human rights area." ' 31 It is through this mechanism, however,
that the Administration has sought to strike a proper balance
between the requirements of the law and the realities of international affairs. Nevertheless, an informed observer might conclude that the insertion of such language into an agreement
effectively categorizes that country as a violator of human
rights. Some observers, therefore, question the efficacy and
propriety of using food aid agreements as a means of publicly
branding countries as violators of human rights.
Food aid is intended not only to feed hungry people, but
also to generate internal development so that a country may
eventually move away from concessional status. Accomplishment of this objective, however, requires the cooperation of the
importing government. In this respect, the salutary and beneficial effects in terms of human rights must be weighed against
the negative political and diplomatic consequences that might
result from naming a country a violator of human rights. It
would appear that a case-by-case approach might be more appropriate in these situations. However, the statute is manda32
tory and does not permit such an approach.
31. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.

32. The ramifications and pitfalls of linking human rights and economic concessions may be seen in the net effect of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act
of 1974, codified at 19 U.S.C. 2432 (1976). Briefly, this amendment tied the granting
of economic concessions, such as most-favored-nation status to "nonmarket economy
countries," i.e., the U.S.S.R., to freedom of emigration.
The U.S.S.R., however, pursuant to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment renounced
the 1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreement as interfering with their domestic affairs.
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A recent report of the Congressional Research Service33
confirms these observations with respect to the linkage of
human rights and foreign aid. The report concluded that
"though public pressures and direct leverage can be effective
instruments of human rights policy, quiet diplomatic efforts
and indirect hints of linkage between human rights conditions
and U.S. support are often likely to be more successful.""4 The
report further states that:
[T]he record on direct and explicit use of foreign assistance as
leverage to bring about specific improvements in human rights
conditions is hardly encouraging. In only five or six instances did
we find evidence that actual or explicitly threatened reductions
in aid played a significant role in bringing about changes in
human rights conditions. Direct pressures seem often to provoke
counterproductive reactions. Chile, Argentina, Ethiopa and the
Philippines represent cases in which such pressures clearly contributed to significant deterioration of bilateral relations.5

Food aid, by its very nature, is a unique method of foreign
assistance. As is pointed out elsewhere in this paper, the thrust
of the U.S. food aid program has moved decidedly in the direction of developmental and humanitarian objectives. Given this
emphasis, it would seem that all U.S. food aid should be made
available in a manner that satisfies the criteria of section 112.
In this respect, U.S. food aid would in every instance further
the general human rights objective of reducing hunger and
malnutrition. Therefore, linking food aid with the political aspects of human rights should not be necessary since the impact
of food aid on the economic aspects of human rights, i.e., freedom from hunger and malnutrition, ought to be sufficient in
and of itself to support food aid programming.
Therefore, in respect to freedom of emigration, the amendment had a severely negative
effect. For example, from 1972 to 1975 emigration from the Soviet Union increased to
about 30,000 persons per year. After the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and
the Soviet renunciation of the Trade Agreement, this figure dropped to less than 10,000
per year. See generally Note, An Interim Analysis of the Effect of the Jackson-Vanih
Amendment on Trade and Human Rights: The Romanian Example, 8 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 193 (1976).

33. Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance, Experiences and Issues in Policy
Implementation, Report of the Foreign Aff. and Nat'l Def. Division, Cong. Research
Serv., for the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Feb. 27, 1979).
34. Id. at vii.
35. Id. at x. See also FOOD RESOURCES FOR DLoM&Tic Puaposps, supra note 12, at
28-29.
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FOOD AID AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The International Development and Food Assistance Act
of 19773 established an innovative mechanism for generating
economic development through the use of food aid. This Act
restructured Title III of P.L. 480 to provide for the complete
forgiveness of P.L. 480 repayment obligations if the recipient
country undertakes agreed upon "additional" development efforts. The administration of this title over the past two years
has brought to the surface a number of serious legal and policy
issues that will affect not only Title III agreements but also the
general direction of the entire P.L. 480 program.
A. Statutory Framework of Title III
Title III is not a separate food aid program; rather, Title
III provides an alternative method by which Title I debt obligations may be satisfied. 7 The quid pro quo for the extinguishment of the debt obligation is the additional development efforts of the recipient country.
In basic form, the concept of Title III is quite straightforward. Section 302 provides that the President may designate a
developing country as eligible for Title III if such country:
(1) needs external resources to improve its food production, marketing, distribution, and storage systems;
(2) meets the criterion used to determine basic eligibility
for development loans from the International Development
Association of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development;
(3) demonstrates the ability to utilize effectively the resources made available under the Title III agreement; and
(4) indicates the willingness to take steps to improve its
food production, marketing, distribution, and storage systems.3
A country designated as eligible and wishing to participate
in a Title III food for development program formulates, "with
the assistance (if requested) of the United States Govern36. Pub. L. No. 95-88, 91 Stat. 533 (1977).
37. Therefore, Title l is subject to all of the requirements of Title I, as well as
those requirements contained in Title I itself. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1727, 1727b(b)
(Supp. 1979).
38. Id. § 1727a(b).
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ment," a multiyear development proposal." The proposal must
include: (1) an annual value or amount of proposed agricultural
commodities to be financed under Title I of P.L. 480; and (2)
an annual plan for the intended uses of the commodities or for
the funds generated from the sale of such commodities for each
year such funds are to be disbursed. The proposal also should
specify the nature and magnitude of problems to be affected by
the effort, and should present targets in quantified terms, insofar as possible."
The statute further requires the proposal to demonstrate
how the Title III development program will be integrated into
and complement the country's overall development plans and
other forms of bilateral and multilateral development assistance." The Title III development plan must not replace any
other development activity. 2 This requirement is generally
described as the "additionality requirement."
Upon review and approval of the development proposal by
the United States, the U.S. and the recipient country enter into
a Title III agreement. A Title III agreement consists of two
annexes attached to a standard Title I agreement. Annex A
contains the standard language found in all Title Ill agreements: it sets forth the obligations of the U.S. and the importing country, as well as establishing mechanisms for reviewing
and implementing the "development proposal." 3 Annex B contains the detailed development proposal that the parties agreed
upon. This Annex varies with each agreement. It stipulates the
projects for which funds generated from the sale of the commodities furnished under the basic Title I agreement may be
disbursed. Normally, funds generated from the sale of the commodities in the recipient country are placed in a special account. The funds then are disbursed from the special account
as needed to carry out the agreed upon development projects.
These disbursements are treated as payments against the underlying Title I debt obligations."
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 1727b(a).
§
§
§
§

1727b(b).
1727b(c).
1727b.
1727d.
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Genesis of Title III
Title III is the culmination of congressional efforts dating
back to the Food for Peace Act of 1966 to make P.L. 480 truly
responsive to the problems of nutrition and development. 5 Efforts to make Title I more effective are continuing both within
the Administration and the Congress."
On the other hand, Title III is also a response to what is
generally perceived as a failure of Title I agreements to effectively address the problems of hunger and malnutrition, either
through the manner in which P.L. 480 commodities were distributed within the recipient country or through "self-help"
measures carried out through the use of the local currency generated by the sale of the P.L. 480 commodities in the recipient
country. All too often, Title I commodities were sold commercially within the recipient country, and the proceeds therefrom
have been utilized for general budget support rather than specific development activities.47 Section 201 of the International
Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978 voices not only
the concerns of Congress but also the concerns of many other
observers:
B.

SEC. 201. The Congress finds that food assistance provided
by the United States to developing countries under Title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
45. The Food for Peace Act of 1966 required for the first time the inclusion of "selfhelp" measures in P.L. 480 agreements. 7 U.S.C. § 1709 (1976). See FOOD FOR PEACE,
supra note 4, at 8-11.
The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 contained a
precursor of Title I. Section 205 of the Act permitted "grant backs" to recipient
countries which would use the local currency proceeds of P.L. 480 commodities for
agreed upon development purposes. No agreement was ever signed under this authority, and with the passage of Title Ill in 1977 this provision of P.L. 480 was repealed.
Pub. L. No. 94-161, 89 Stat. 849, 850-51 (1975) (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. §
1706(b)(2) (Supp. 1979)).
46. See, e.g., §§ 202-203 of the International Development and Food Assistance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-424, 92 Stat. 955 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 1727c-1727d
(Supp. 1979)), which made Title III more attractive for relatively least developed
countries, as defined by UNCTAD, by allowing the United States to pay transportation costs and permitting excess Title III disbursements in any given year to be applied
against preexisting P.L. 480 debt obligations. It is expected that Title III will again be
amended in 1979 to make the program more responsive to the needs of developing
countries.
47. The use of local currencies generated from the sale of P.L. 480 commodities
for general budget support is not per se objectionable. Such support can be very
beneficial in countries undertaking significant development activities.
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often is distributed within those countries in ways which do not
significantly alleviate hunger and malnutrition in those countries. In order to determine how United States food assistance can
be more effectively used to meet the food needs of the poor in
developing countries, the President shall submit to the Congress
not later than February 1, 1979, a report (1) explaining why food
assistance provided to developing countries under Title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 is
not more successful in meeting the food needs of those suffering
from hunger and malnutrition, and (2) recommending steps
which could be taken (including increasing the proportion of food
assistance which is furnished under Titles II and III of that Act)
to increase the effectiveness of food assistance under that Act in
meeting those needs. 8

It is against this background that Title III came into being.

C.

Implementation of Title III
To date, four countries have entered into Title III agreements: Bolivia, Bangladesh, Honduras, and Egypt. In addition, Title III agreements with a number of other countries
have been proposed. The consideration of these proposals
48. Pub. L. No. 95-424, 92 Stat. 937, 954 (1978) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1711
(Supp. 1979)).
The President's report to Congress, submitted February 23, 1979, pursuant to the
above section, demonstrates a critical problem in the administration of P.L. 480, i.e.,
the report fails to directly address the question raised by section 201. The report is
merely a vague narrative of what has been accomplished under Title I agreements and
how progress is being made toward making Title I more developmental. It does not
address, in any fashion, the use of Title I for general budget support or, in a historical
context, the abuses of the program in Southeast Asia and in other countries.
In this respect, it is clear that the authors of the report simply do not agree with
the conclusions of section 201, or that they disagree with the underlying philosophy of
section 201, i.e., that U.S. food aid programs must be strictly scrutinized in order to
assure that P.L. 480 commodities are contributing directly to the alleviation of hunger
and malnutrition. This basic philosophical conflict between administrators of P.L. 480
and the legislative branch is probably based on a number of factors: (1) the need to
accommodate political and diplomatic considerations, which may render strict scrutiny of P.L. 480 programs difficult or impossible; (2) the perception among administrators that tight control over the use of P.L. 480 commodities, or the proceeds generated
therefrom, is not practicable or desirable; and (3) a tendency for development professionals to emphasize intangible "policy changes," while the thrust of the legislation is
clearly to encourage the undertaking of concrete development projects.
As a result of this tension between the administration of the program and the
legislative intent, Congress has increasingly placed specific restraints upon P.L. 480,
thereby attempting to channel the program into areas which more clearly reflect the
legislative intent. This process has produced a program which is incredibly complex
and difficult to operate. From the recipient's point of view, the constraints of the
programs are so great as to measurably reduce the attractiveness of participating.
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has brought to the fore a number of issues that touch upon extremely important questions not specifically contemplated by
the statute. Thus, as is the case with almost every legislative
enactment, the administrative interpretation and implementation of Title III will determine whether Title III will achieve its
ultimate purpose of enhancing economic development.
1. Generation of Title III Proposals
The statute clearly contemplates that Title III proposals
will be developed primarily by the recipient country." Specifically, the statute states that a "country designated as eligible
and wishing to participate in a Food for Development Program
shall formulate, with the assistance (if requested) of the United
States Government, a multiyear proposal which shall be submitted to the President. ' 50 (Emphasis added.) In addition, the
statute states that one of the criteria for eligibility to participate in a Title III program is that the recipient country
"indicate the willingness to take steps to improve its food pro'5
duction, marketing, distribution, and storage systems." '
However, most Title II proposals are being developed, not
by the recipient countries, but by the Agency for International
Development (AID), in its missions in the field and in
Washington. This situation is the result of: (1) the relative
unattractiveness of Title I in comparison with Title I; and (2)
the endorsement of "interventionism" by some food aid programmers.
First, Title III appears relatively unattractive in comparison with Title I. Title I offers concessional credit of up to fortyyear terms with a ten-year grace period on payments of principal. The grant element of a Title I agreement is approximately
sixty percent, and as it has developed over the years, there are
relatively few, if any, effective restrictions on the use of local
currency proceeds.
Title III, in contrast, requires a strict accounting of local
currency proceeds, as well as the continued monitoring of progress made under the Title III agreement. In this context, the
49. Inherent in this concept is the assumption that Title ml is sufficiently attractive to induce developing countries to participate. As will be discussed later in the text,
this assumption may well be incorrect.
50. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1727b(a) (Supp. 1979).
51. Id. § 1727a(b).
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prospect of achieving complete debt forgiveness holds little attraction in comparison with a Title I repayment schedule of
forty years, especially when it is taken into consideration that
most governments have a time horizon of only a few years at
most.
Second, food aid programmers have often followed what
may be described as an "interventionist" policy. That is, in
many cases programmers have insisted upon including policy
changes by the recipient country as the centerpiece of Title IIn
agreements, often over the objections of the potential recipient.
For obvious reasons then, such agreements are not attractive
to officials of the recipient country, who rightfully view U.S.
insistence on important policy changes as encroaching upon
their own authority as well as the sovereignty of their country.
It is questionable whether the emphasis on policy
changes is in harmony with the intent of Title III. First, Title
III clearly contemplates that recipient countries will enter into
Title III agreements willingly. Emphasis on policy changes as
the central feature of Title III agreements seems to run contrary to this objective in many instances. Second, the entire
tenor of Title Ill focuses upon specificity both in the Title III
agreement itself and in its implementation. In many cases,
however, policy changes do not lend themselves to specificity.
In this respect, the emphasis on policy changes resembles, to a
certain degree, the "self-help" measures of Title I. As explained above, Title III was enacted in large part as a reaction
against the manner in which Title I had been administered.
Third, in many instances, policy changes do not actually require added resources either in the form of the commodity itself
or in the form of local currency proceeds from the sale of the
commodity. Title III, however, clearly contemplates that additional, tangible development will be generated through the use
of additional resources provided by the Title III commodity.
Policy changes not directly connected to or supported by the
provision of the Title III commodity would therefore appear to
be outside the scope of the statute.
This is not to say that policy changes cannot or should not
play an important role in Title III programs. However, Title III
is clearly project oriented, both in its language and basic purpose. The administrative emphasis on policy changes as op-
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posed to projects, while not precluded by the statute, appears
somewhat inconsistent with the basic orientation of Title III.
2. Additionality Requirement: Policy Changes vs.
Development Projects
The issue of policy changes and development projects is
again met in dealing with the requirement of "additionality."
Briefly, the statute requires that a Title III program complement, but not replace, assistance authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, or any other program of bilateral or
multilateral assistance, or under the development program of
the country desiring to initiate a Food for Development Program [sic]. ' 5 2 The issue presented, therefore, is whether policy
changes, in and of themselves, may satisfy the additionality
requirement.
For example, a number of proposals, in their original form,
contemplated the use of Title HI commodities in grain stabilization operations known as open market sales (OMS) systems.
Simply put, the recipient government would agree to policy
changes in which the government would undertake to stabilize
the price of grain by purchasing it at a minimum procurement
price during times of plenty, thereby helping local farmers, and
by selling stocks built up in this manner during lean times. The
commodities from Title III would be added to government
stocks.
In their original form, these proposals allowed a complete
forgiveness of the Title I-Title III repayment obligation upon
receipt of the Title III commodity by the recipient government.
The policy change to implement the OMS system, under such
a proposal, would satisfy the requirement of additionality.
Since the statute does permit the use of the commodities for
the development program, the appropriate point at which debt
forgiveness is triggered would be when the transfer of title to
the commodity occurs.
Such a proposal, on its face, appears to fulfill the requirements of Title III. In substance, however, this proposal does not
differ from a Title I "self-help" measure, especially when it is
considered that local currency proceeds will be generated by
OMS sales. Although the legislative history and the statute are
not clear as to how the commodities themselves may be used
52. Id. § 1727b(c).
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to trigger debt forgiveness, it would seem apparent from the
structure and purpose of Title III that the use of the commodity
satisfies Title III requirements only where it generates development directly without first generating local currency proceeds
(e.g., food-for-work and direct maternal feeding). OMS systems do not fall into this category.
Second, and more important, the use of local currency
proceeds for additional development projects is not inconsistent with the implementation of policy changes, whether or not
those policy changes are themselves additional. Indeed, it is
more logical to assume that specific development projects
should be included so as to build the physical infrastructure
upon which the policy changes are based.5 3 In an OMS system,
such projects may include additional and better quality storage
capacity, improved internal distribution systems, increased
fertilizer production, and so forth.
Furthermore, it appears illogical to argue, as some food aid
programmers have done, that the undertaking of policy
changes and additional development projects is too much to
ask of the recipient country. First, proposed policy changes are
generally presented as both very significant, and difficult for
the government of the recipient country to implement. If this
is the case, it is illogical to assume that the use of the local
currency proceeds to carry out additional development projects, such as the construction of additional storage, is beyond
the capabilities of the recipient government. In fact, the only
logical basis for such an argument is that the recipient government will have insufficient inducement to carry out the proposed policy changes if it is unable to use the local currency
proceeds for general budget support. However, this problem is
precisely one of the abuses at which Title III is aimed.
Second, policy changes do not exist in a vacuum. They
must be based on a sound internal infrastructure. To this extent, development projects should precede or coincide with policy changes, rather than the reverse. Also, it seems more appropriate for the United States to provide developing countries
with the physical resources necessary to carry out development
53. To the extent that the additional policy changes themselves require local
currency expenditures, the use of local currency proceeds from the sale of the Title In
commodity qualifies for debt forgiveness.
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projects, rather than attempting to dictate internal development policies to such countries.
Thus far, this issue has been resolved by requiring that
local currency proceeds be applied to development projects."
However, in the absence of further legislative guidance, this
issue promises to remain in the forefront of Title III programming.
3. Additionality Requirement: Augmentation of the
Special Account
In a number of countries, food commodities from P.L. 480,
as well as other sources, are sold at a subsidized rate. In such
situations, generations of local currency proceeds are insufficient to offset the Title I-Title III repayment obligation. To
remedy this "problem," some food aid programmers propose
that recipient governments be permitted to augment the
''special account" in order to provide enough local currency to
achieve total debt forgiveness. However, neither the statute nor
the legislative history addresses the question of subsidized
sales. Therefore, a question exists as to whether the statute
permits augmentation of the special account. 5
On the one hand, funds used to augment the special account are not "[f]unds generated from the sale of [Title II]
agricultural commodities .... "51 On the other hand, there is
nothing to prevent a country from creating a government corporation, analogous to the Commodity Credit Corporation,
that would first "purchase" the commodity at its full fair market value.
Of more importance, however, is whether the augmentation of the special account really reflects the input of additional
resources, which the commodities are meant to represent. The
consumption of subsidized commodities cannot be considered
an additional resource which is available to development programs. The augmentation funds must come from the general
budget of the recipient. It is questionable, in view of the fungi54. Whether these projects need be "additional" is still in dispute.
55. It is clearly permissible under the statute not to have augmentation of the
special account. In such an instance, debt forgiveness would equal, assuming proper
disbursements for eligible uses, the amount of local currency generated. The remaining
debt would be repaid in accordance with ordinary Title I procedures.
56. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1727d(a) (Supp. 1979).
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bility of money, whether this action does not, in fact reduce a
country's ability to undertake its own development program. If
such a reduction did occur, the additionality requirement
would not be met.
In practice, where augmentation is permitted, 5 language
inserted in the Title III agreement states that the augmentation funds will not be taken from or in any way reduce the
recipient country's development budget. Nevertheless, there is
58
probably no effective way to verify this requirement.
4. Prefinancing of the Special Account
Some recipient countries have expressed a desire to "prefinance" the special account by placing local currencies into the
account prior to the sale of a Title III commodity. The arguments in favor of prefinancing are persuasive; tying financial
arrangements to commodity shipments and sales may not lend
themselves to efficient synchronization with a development
program. Conversely, prefinancing allows the recipient country
to have the financing mechanism for its food for development
program fully operational at a specified time. Prefinancing also
permits the recipient country to embark upon its development
program earlier than would otherwise be possible.
Prefinancing, however, is not specifically provided for in
the statute. Funds used to prefinance the special account technically are not "funds generated from the sale of the commodities." More importantly, it is difficult to see how the use of such
funds for development projects prior to the arrival of the commodity in the recipient country can meet the requirements of
additionality. That is, how can an "additional" development
project be undertaken in the absence of the additional resources which are represented by the commodities?
This leads to a second question pertaining to the source of
funds used for prefinancing the special account. As is the case
with augmentation, it will probably be impossible to verify that
57. In fact, it would appear that augmentation is becoming an administrative
requirement, although the statute does not dictate such a result.
58. One might also question the ultimate purpose of augmentation. Its proponents
generally argue that its purpose is to guarantee that the U.S. will receive the most
development "bang" for its P.L. 480 Title I-Title III commodities. On the other hand,
those who question the wisdom of augmentation generally characterize it as a method
of assuring the recipient country complete debt forgiveness, despite the obvious danger
of violating the additionality requirement.
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prefinancing funds have not reduced the recipient country's
development budget or, conversely, that the local currency proceeds generated from the eventual sale of the commodities will
replace funds taken from the government's development
budget to prefinance the special account.
As a practical matter, prefinancing is permitted only to a
very limited degree. For example, prefinancing has been allowed but at a time no earlier than when title to the commodities passes to the recipient country." The value of the prefinancing also may not exceed the value of the commodities
actually shipped. That is, disbursements from the special account will not be eligible to offset debt obligations until the
commodity actually arrives in the recipient country.
These restrictions, however, are not final authority and it
is conceivable that they will be liberalized to a significant degree. The benefits and flexibility of prefinancing are substantial and ought not to be foregone if reasonable assurances can
be obtained that the additionality requirement will be met.
However, the potential pitfalls of prefinancing should be approached very cautiously. Also, further legislative guidance in
this area should be sought. 0
59. Generally, property title passes at the U.S. port of shipment.
60. In fact, it does appear that further legislative guidance will be forthcoming.
The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on the
International Development and Cooperation Act of 1979 contains the following statement:
Prefinancing
Additionally, in connection with interpretation of the section 305 legislative requirement that the proceeds from the sale of Title III commodities
be applied against the participating country's repayment obligations, the
Committee does not intend this requirement to preclude the possibility
of prefinancing. In order to be able to undertake its Title III development
activities without having to wait until purchase authorizations are issued
and the recipient country legally takes title to the commodities, the participating country may, on a year by year basis, deposit local currencies
into the special account and make disbursements in an amount equivalent to the value of the Title III commodities for each year of the Title
III agreement. However, in cases where prefinancing of this type is utilized, the participating country must assume the risk that, if the purchase authorizations are not negotiated for any reason, the participating
country will not be eligible for the repayment benefit specified in section
305 [codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1727d (Supp. 1979)].
H.R. REP. No. 79, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1979).
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Criticism of Title III

Criticism of Title III generally comes from two divergent
points of view. On the one hand, critics of P.L. 480 attack Title
III as a wholesale giveaway. These critics take an extremely
pessimistic view of the ability or the willingness of the U.S.
food aid bureaucracy to administer Title III in a manner consistent with the legislative intent. They correctly point out that
Title III objectives could be accomplished through strict implementation of Title I "self-help" measures. In the absence of
better performance under Title I, these critics see little reason
to believe that the marginally greater attractiveness of Title III
will induce behavioral changes either in the recipient countries
or in the U.S. food aid bureaucracy."
In contrast, food aid programmers and development theorists criticized the entire structure of Title III, and P.L. 480 in
general, as totally unrealistic in meeting economic development needs of the Third World. These critics view the extreme
complexity of P.L. 480 and Title Ill in particular as preventing
the effective use of food aid to generate economic development.
They point out that managerial skills are very scarce in Third
World countries and conclude that such skills should not be
squandered in futile attempts to satisfy the endless requirements of P.L. 480. Moreover, they see little or no utility in
compelling recipient countries to conform to these requirements.
In all fairness, then, it must be stated that some food aid
programmers and development theorists view the statutory
requirements of P.L. 480 as stumbling blocks to be avoided to
the greatest extent possible, rather than as policy statements
of the Congress to serve as guideposts in administering the
statute. The extreme complexity of the P.L. 480 program lends
credence to these views.
It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to pass judgment on these contending points of view. It is enough to point
61. This view was only confirmed when a Title III proposal came from a country
that repeatedly failed to implement agreed upon self-help measures under Title I
agreements. The Title III proposal contained a number of policy changes and other
measures that had been self-help measures in previous Title I agreements never before
implemented.
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out that they exist and represent a significant source of tension
within the administration of the program.
V. FOOD SECURITY
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the
wide variety of proposals for food security schemes which have
been put forth. 2 Rather, this portion of the paper will focus
upon presently existing food aid commitments, as well as legislative proposals to develop food reserves.
A. The Problem of Hunger and Malnutrition
The question of food aid security is of pressing importance.
Statistics clearly indicate that while food production is advancing well ahead of population growth in developed countries,
food production in developing countries is barely keeping pace
with their population growth. 3 Compounding the problem is
already existing widespread hunger and malnutrition. It is estimated that nearly two billion people in the developing countries are undernourished."
It is evident from these facts that the developing countries
will become increasingly reliant upon food transfers from the
developed countries. These transfers may take the form of commercial imports and food aid.
It is equally clear that most developing countries do not
have the financial assets to meet their food deficits adequately
through commercial imports alone. 5 The remainder must be
met through food aid in one form or another. In the past year,
food aid commitments equaled about nine million tons, or
about twenty percent of the estimated imports by developing
countries. As food deficits expand, food aid programming
should expand accordingly.
62. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-25.
63. From 1968 to 1977, food production in industrialized democracies increased
an average of 2.7% per year while population increased 1% per year. In contrast,
developing countries, excluding Communist Asia, achieved a food production increase
of 2.95% per annum as compared to a population increase of 2.6% per annum. World
Population Silent Explosion, 78 DEP'T STATE BuLL. (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1978). See FOREIGN FOOD AssISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at I-I to -5.
64. World Population Silent Explosion, supra note 63, at 1 (Nov. 1978; Foreign Food Assistance of the United States, supra note 1, at I-1 to -5.
65. World Population Silent Explosion, supra note 63, at 1 (Nov. 1978).
66. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
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B.

Food Aid Commitments
1. International Efforts
In 1974, when food shortages in many parts of the world
reached crisis levels, the U.N. World Food Conference called
upon the developed nations of the world to establish a goal of
ten million metric tons of food aid per year.67 The United States
supports this goal. 8 Nevertheless, little has been done since
that time to translate this goal into a workable system of food
aid commitments and reserves to guarantee a steady flow of
food aid in adverse, as well as favorable, conditions. To a
certain extent, relatively good harvests around the world since
1974 may have lulled donors and recipients alike into complacency."6

For example, the present Food Aid Convention of the International Wheat Agreement obligates donor members to
make available a total of only 4,226,000 metric tons of food aid
each year. The individual amounts are as follows:
Argentina
Australia
Canada
European Economic Community
Finland
Japan
Sweden
Switzerland
United States of America

Metric Tons
23,000
225,000
495,000
1,287,000
14,000
225,000
35,000
32,000
1,890,00070

At the same time, little progress has been made toward establishing an international system of reserves to stabilize grain
prices and guarantee access to supplies even in times of short
supply. Recent negotiations on a new International Wheat
Agreement, which would establish such reserves, have collapsed, and there is little prospect that they will be revived."
Id.
68. 7 U.S.C. § 1691a (1976).
69. See statement of Rep. McHugh in H.R. REP. No. 348, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
350, 352-53, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1704, 1918.
70. Of the 1.9 million tons delivered by the United States between July 1976 and
67.

June 1977, 49% was programmed under Title II. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD FOR
PEACE: 1977 ANNUAL REPORT ON PUBLIC LAW 480, at 45 (1978).
71. See Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1979, at A26. col. 1.
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2. US. Food Aid Commitment
The problem with respect to U.S. food aid commitments
is summed up very succinctly by the "availability" criteria of
section 401(a) of P.L. 480:
No commodity shall be available for disposition under this Act
if such disposition would reduce the domestic supply of such
commodity below that needed to meet domestic requirements,
adequate carryover, and anticipated exports for dollars as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture at the time of exportation
of such commodity, unless the Secretary of Agriculture determines that some part of the supply thereof should be used to
carry out urgent humanitarian purposes of this Act."

In effect, this provision designates food aid as the lowest level
priority use for U.S. food commodities. Outside of the very
limited exception for urgent humanitarian purposes, commodities may not be programmed under P.L. 480 unless stocks are
adequate to meet domestic needs and export demands. This
provision of law, which protects consumer and producer interests, substantially reduces the value of U.S. food aid commitments to recipient countries since they cannot depend upon a
steady flow of U.S. food aid. The problem is demonstrated by
the impact of world grain shortages in 1972 and following
73
years.
During the 1960s, P.L. 480 annual shipments averaged
about 14.5 million metric tons. Since that time, the level of
P.L. 480 programming in terms of quantity of commodities74
has declined precipitously to the point where during the past
six years grain shipments averaged less than five million tons
per year, with a low of three million tons in 1974. Despite the
intentions of the Carter administration to increase food aid
programming substantially, programming levels appear to
have leveled off at around 6.0-6.3 million tons per year.75
72. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1731(a) (Supp. 1979).
73. For a more detailed analysis of this subject and the figures found in the text
see

SPECIAL TASK

FORCE

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 49-52, 127-28.

74. P. L. 480 authorizations are made in terms of dollars. Consequently, in times
of rising prices, the same level of monetary expenditures will result in a lower level of
quantities programmed.
75. In the report Foreign Food Assistance of the United States, supra note 1, at
VI-5, the Secretary of Agriculture recommends increasing food aid tonnages by 50%,
or, if possible, by 100% (a level of 12.6 million metric tons) by 1982. In fact, programming in 1977, 1978, and 1979 averaged somewhat above 6 million metric tons on an
annual basis. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52-53.
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The sluggishness in real growth of levels of food aid programming, as well as the overall reduced levels when compared
with the levels of the 1960s, is a reflection of: (1) generally
rising effective demand for U.S. agricultural exports; and (2)
domestic farm policy decisions to reduce the amount of foodstuffs grown by the United States. Simply stated, the volume
of food aid has declined dramatically as the opportunity costs
of providing such aid have increased."
Given the basic population trends and food production
levels outside the United States, it is unrealistic to assume that
the opportunity costs of providing food aid will decline in the
foreseeable future. The only other methods of relieving pressure
upon levels of food aid programming would be either: (1) to
allocate much larger sums of money for the purchase of P.L.
480 commodities; or (2) to relax farm production controls,
thereby increasing available supplies while decreasing the price
of commodities available for the P.L. 480 program.
Neither solution is acceptable at this time. Fiscal and inflationary pressures undoubtedly preclude substantial increases in P.L. 480 expenditures. Conversely, political pressures probably preclude any reduction in grain prices through
supply increases, especially when it is considered that grain
prices have already been at relatively low levels over the past
three years. Under these conditions, only marginal increases in
levels of P.L. 480 programming may be expected during the
next few years.
The ultimate question confronting food and agriculture
policymakers today is how can policies which reduce the availability and raise the price of basic foodstuffs in a hungry world
be morally justified." The United States has clearly embarked
upon a concerted policy of supply management. 8 The central
features of this program are:
1. Implementation of acreage limitations on U.S. production to avoid building "excess" stocks of grain; and
76. Hanrahan & Kennedy, International Considerationsin the Development of
Domestic Agricultural and Food Policy, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL
FOOD POLICY REVIEW 130, 135 (1977).

77. See Anderson, note 4 supra.
78. See Foreign Food Assistance of the United States, supra note 1, at VIII-1 to -
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2. Creation of farmer-held reserves and commercially
held stocks of about 30 million metric tons of grain.7" At the
same time, it is clear that the first consumption sector to suffer
in a supply reduction program is the food aid sector. Although
P.L. 480 shipments have always been small "relative to total
use they have varied directly with the level of 'excess supplies.'","
It is simplistic to view this issue as one of food production
versus poor and hungry people. The U.S. agricultural sector is
extremely complex, and any changes in the level ofP.L. 480
programming will have a significant effect upon U.S. agriculture." Furthermore, whether greater levels of food aid are accomplished through increased expenditures or through modifications of agricultural policies, any increase in food aid represents a real cost which society must bear. The proper question,
then, is not whether the United States can morally justify reduced food production in a hungry world, but rather whether
the United States is contributing its fair share towards reducing hunger and malnutrition in the world.
American agriculture is the most productive in the world,
but it can only maintain its productivity so long as producers
are adequately compensated. It is not possible to constantly
run the agricultural sector of our economy at 100% capacity
without causing severe dislocations in all sectors of our economy. Therefore, the long run interests of consumers, both rich
and poor alike, are best served by a healthy farm economy
operating at sustainable levels. Experience over the past
fifty years has shown that production controls are at times
necessary to maintain a healthy farm economy.
Of course, agricultural policy should take into account
food aid needs. Such needs are an important consideration.
Nevertheless, they are only one among a number of factors
which must be considered. No single factor can or should dominate agricultural policy decisions.
3. Emergency Food Aid Security
An important subsidiary question to the general issue of
79. See, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1445e (Supp. 1979).
80. SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
81. Id. at 52-60.
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food aid policy is how best to avoid the 1973-1975 disaster when
unexpected shortfalls and commercial purchases drastically
reduced the amount of food available for food aid purposes.
The Carter administration's response was to propose the creation of an International Emergency Wheat Reserve (IEWR).
As proposed by the Administration, the reserve would
have consisted of six million tons of wheat. Stocks of wheat
from this reserve could only be used when short supply situations, such as existed in 1973-1975, prevent normal food aid
programming. The concept of such a reserve received substantial support in the fall of 1977; however, a Senate provision
establishing the reserve was deleted from the 1977 farm bill by
8
the conference committee. 1
Thereafter, a number of bills were introduced in both the
Senate and the House to establish an IEWR in one form or
another. The bills were considered by the Senate Agriculture
Committee, the House Agriculture Committee, and the House
International Relations Committee during the spring and summer of 1978.
The House Committees eventually reported substantially
identical bills, both very similar in substance and form to the
Administration proposal. The Senate Agriculture Committee,
however, reported a radically different bill creating an international emergency food fund. Conceptually, the fund was to
provide money to purchase extra commodities in times of short
supply. The basic philosophy of the bill's sponsors was that
3
there is no such thing as "short supply" if the price is right.8
The Senate bill was unacceptable to the Administration,
and neither the House nor the Senate took any further action
on this subject.
82. S. CONF. REP. No. 418, 95TH CONG., IST SEss. 183-84 (1977).
83. Farmers look very disfavorably upon any kind of government-held reserves
after the experience of the 1960s when government-held reserves were used to hold
down commodity prices. These suspicions, then, are visited upon the IEWR, which is
heavily laden with restrictions on the release of stocks-stocks too small to affect
market prices in any appreciable manner.
Another factor is that in 1977 grain prices were very low, and any device, such as
the IEWR, that would have taken grain off the market looked very attractive to farm
state representatives. However, by late 1978 grain prices had stabilized, and, accordingly, the IEWR looked less attractive.
For more information on this specific topic see Jones, World FoodFund: You Can't
Eat Money, Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 1978, at A15, col. 1.
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CONCLUSION

As seen from the above discussion, the U.S. food aid program has been in a constant state of evolution since its inception in 1954. The program continues to be beset by a myriad
of considerations, many contradictory and conflicting. It is the
interplay of these factors that generates the momentum by
which P.L. 480 continues to develop and evolve.
It is most encouraging to note that this evolution continues
in the direction of greater emphasis upon the humanitarian
and developmental aspects of P.L. 480. At the same time, the
overall level of P.L. 480 programming in comparison with previous years is somewhat discouraging. Therefore, the prognosis
for the program is rather unclear. The quality and quantity of
food aid are mutually necessary and complementary aspects of
the food aid program. Whether both objectives can be accomplished simultaneously remains to be seen.

